A British commentator argues that Europe’s self-inflicted economic and strategic decline has opened a power vacuum that helps explain the tougher American posture under President Trump.

Konstantin Kisin, the co-host of the Triggernometry podcast, laid out a blunt critique of Europe’s direction and its impact on Western foreign policy. He told Steven Bartlett on the “Diary of a CEO” podcast that Europe has grown comfortable and complacent, and that this shift matters for global security. From his view, these choices have consequences that are now showing up in transatlantic relations.

“Europe is 12 percent of the world’s population, 25 percent of the world’s GDP, and 60 percent of the world’s welfare spending,” Kisin began on Steven Bartlett’s “Diary of a CEO” podcast. “So if you do that, that is a sign that you’ve got very comfortable. You’ve got very lazy; you have lost the ability to realize you live in a dangerous world.” He used blunt numbers to show how spending and priorities can shape strategic options.

You know this is a bit of a sidetrack, but it is an important adendum to this conversation. This is why European countries have pursued economic suicide, that we call “net-zero,” as vigorously as we have. Because we have felt so safe and so comfortable, we’ve engaged in all these luxury obsessions. To the point where, as you know, Germany destroyed its nuclear facilities, thereby making itself reliant on Russian gas. So when Russia invaded Ukraine, the Germans, the first thing that they said was ‘oh, we are going to support Ukraine, we will give them 5,000 helmets.’ Because they were so dependent on Russian gas, because they refuse to produce their own energy.

This is exactly the same thing we’ve done in Britain. Britain has the highest industrial electricity prices in the world. In the developed world, which means we basically destroyed all our manufacturing industry, which is now produced elsewhere. We’re getting to the point where we can’t make our own virgin steel. Steel is kind of important if you want to have a military. Etc, etc, etc.

“So in Europe in particular, this has happened because we’ve just felt so safe and so comfortable and also so rudderless, that we’ve been able to engage in all these loony ideas because there has been no consequence. Well, the consequences are here,” he added.

Steven Bartlett moved from that diagnosis to a broader question about President Trump’s assertive foreign policy moves, naming high-profile incidents and asking why America appears to be acting so forcefully on its own. Bartlett mentioned actions like the alleged “kidnapping” in Venezuela, moves on resources, and brazen ideas such as Greenland, using them to illustrate a new American willingness to project power. Kisin answered without hedging: when allies shrink their capabilities, the United States fills the gap or watches others do so.

“This is what happens when there is a shifting of the balance of power,” Kisin argued. “This is why I always said maintaining the unipolar moment as it was, and not allowing the West to weaken itself, was a really important thing. Because the moment you have a power vacuum, you always have a power struggle.” He framed Trump’s behavior as a reaction to shifting capability, not mere testosterone.

All Trump really is doing is reflecting the reality that has been already there for years, except he is reflecting it in American foreign policy. He’s saying, ‘Well, look, if Russia is going to do what it wants to do and we can’t stop them, and if China is going to do what they want to do and we can’t stop them, well, we’ve got to do what we’ve got to do, and no one is going to stop us.’ And that’s the world you’ve ended up in.

From Kisin’s standpoint, Europe’s institutions and many leaders are offering little more than verbal protests while real advantage accrues to rival powers. That kind of posture invites unilateral action by the only remaining actor willing to push back, and for many conservatives that actor is the United States under President Trump. When allies decline to carry weight, the burden shifts to whoever still has the will and the means to act.

That shift is the heart of the argument: weak partners change the incentives for a nation that still sees threats as immediate and solvable. If U.S. policy becomes muscular because partners won’t match commitments, then the policy follows from the strategic landscape rather than simple election rhetoric. For those who believe Western strength matters, the cure is obvious—restore capacity and resolve among allies, or accept a more dominant American role.

Kisin’s case lands as both critique and warning: European choices on energy, industry, and social spending ripple into geopolitics. The debate over Trump’s tactics is therefore less about personality and more about consequence—how a shrinking Europe reshapes the options Washington judges necessary. That reality forces hard decisions about burden sharing and the future shape of Western power.