The Supreme Court’s recent decision upholds sex-separated sports under Title IX and the Equal Protection Clause, and Justice Clarence Thomas added a forceful concurrence that questions treating transgender status as a suspect class while insisting biological sex remains an immutable truth.

The Court issued a 6-3 ruling finding that schools can offer separate athletic teams based on sex assigned at birth without violating federal law. The cases came from Idaho and West Virginia and challenged state laws that bar males from girls’ and women’s teams. The opinion affirms that Title IX and the Equal Protection Clause do not forbid states from making those distinctions.

One case arose from Idaho’s Fairness in Women’s Sports Act, enacted in 2020, which prohibits trans women and trans girls from competing on female teams in public K-12 schools and colleges. The other arose from West Virginia’s Save Women’s Sports Act, which similarly requires teams to be designated by biological sex. Parents and athletes challenged those laws, arguing the statutes violated Title IX and equal protection guarantees.

The Court heard both Little v. Hecox and West Virginia v. B.P.J. and rejected the argument that recognizing sex-separated athletics in these instances runs afoul of federal civil rights law. The majority concluded that classifying teams by biological sex is a permissible approach for preserving fair competition and safety in women’s sports. That view gives states room to maintain protections for female athletes.

On January 13, the Supreme Court heard two cases — Little v. Hecox and West Virginia v. B.P.J. — that both deal with the same issue, namely state laws that prohibit males from participating in women’s and girls’ sports even if they identify as transgender.

Little v. Hecox is the case out of Idaho, stemming from a 2020 law called the Fairness in Women’s Sports Act (HB 500). That act bars ‘trans women’ and ‘trans girls’ from female athletic teams in public K-12 schools and colleges. Lindsay Hlcox, a male, sued after being barred from joining Boise State University’s women’s cross-country and track teams. Helcox claimed the legislation violates the Equal Protection Clause and Title IX.

West Virginia v. B.P.J. is a similar case. Following West Virginia’s enactment of the Save Women’s Sports Act (HB 3293), which requires public school and college teams to be designated based on biological sex. It bars males from girls’ and women’s teams in secondary schools and colleges. The mother of Becky Pepper-Jackson, a male, sued on his behalf on similar grounds.

Justice Thomas wrote a separate concurrence and made two pointed arguments that will shape how conservatives and many parents view the ruling. He emphasized that transgender status does not meet the threshold for heightened equal-protection scrutiny and framed gender dysphoria as a mutable medical condition rather than an immutable status. His language underlines a distinction between identity claims and legal categories the Court treats as highly protected.

The Court correctly holds that neither Title IX nor the Equal Protection Clause prohibits States from offering sex separated athletics. A man does not have a legal right to compete against women just because he believes that he is a woman. I join the Court’s opinion in full. I write separately to make two points. First, transgender status is not a suspect class requiring heightened equal-protection scrutiny. United States v. Skrmetti, 605 U. S. 495, 547–557 (2025) (BARRETT, J., concurring). The class of people who claim transgender status could more accurately be described as people who are experiencing “gender dysphoria,” which is not a “discrete group.” Id., at 550–551 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also id., at 566–567 (ALITO, J., concurring and concurring in judgment). Because “gender dysphoria” is a mutable mental state that is the object of psychiatric treatment, it does not resemble the immutable characteristics on the basis of which our precedents have applied heightened scrutiny— race, sex, or national origin. Instead, gender dysphoria resembles other characteristics on the basis of which legislatures may classify with a merely rational basis. See, e.g., Heller v. Doe, 509 U. S. 312, 321 (1993) (mental illness); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U. S. 202, 220 (1982) (immigration status). 

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Legislatures have many obvious rational bases to keep men who believe that they are women out of teams and private spaces reserved for women. Second, as the Court recognizes, this case concerns “biological men” and “boys who identify as girls.” Ante, at 10, 27. Men and boys with gender dysphoria are not women or girls, even if they believe that they are. Sex is an immutable “biological” characteristic, see ante, at 10; it is binary; and “man” and “woman,” “boy” and “girl,” are the terms that correspond to adults and children of each sex. See A. Byrne, Are Women Adult Human Females? 177 Philosophical Studies 3783, 3786–3787 (2020). To use language to obscure reality—to show “indifference regarding the truth”— is to lie to the public and cease to treat our fellow citizens “as equal[s].” J. Pieper, Abuse of Language—Abuse of Power 17, 21 (1992).

The concurrence will energize conservatives who see this as a defense of fairness and female-only spaces, while provoking strong reactions from those who argue for broader inclusion. For Republican readers, Thomas’s opinion reads as a clear legal and cultural statement: law should reflect biological realities and preserve sex-based protections. That position will influence state lawmakers and future litigation over how sex and gender are treated in public policy.

The ruling also hands states a roadmap for crafting statutes that protect competitive integrity in women’s sports without drawing a constitutional line the Court says it will not cross. Expect legislative efforts to cite this decision when drafting or defending laws that distinguish teams by biological sex. The practical effect is straightforward: schools now have firmer legal ground to keep males off female teams where state law requires it.

Public debate will continue, but the Court’s majority and Thomas’s concurrence together make a powerful statement about how federal law and the Constitution apply to sex-separated athletics. That outcome reshapes the legal terrain for similar disputes, and it gives states a strong basis to defend sex-based distinctions in sports. The discussion now shifts from courts to legislatures and communities where policy and values meet on playing fields and locker rooms.

Where’s the lie?