An American citizen who spent years in China has pleaded guilty to acting as an agent of the People’s Republic of China while operating inside the United States, admitting he worked under the direction of Chinese handlers to recruit and manage sources, move digital devices for communications, and pass sensitive information back to his handlers.
Thomas Weir Pauken II, 50, entered a guilty plea after federal investigators concluded he operated at the direction and control of people he knew worked for the PRC. He lived and worked in China before carrying out activities in the U.S., and his case centers on unregistered work on behalf of a foreign government inside American borders.
According to court documents, Pauken’s activities ran from at least 2019 until February 2026 and began after contacts he made in China in 2017. One individual, identified as “Cathy,” provided taskings that included meeting with potential intelligence assets, supplying devices like laptops and cellphones to keep communications off standard channels, assigning specific information-gathering tasks, and receiving reports from those assets.
“Pauken admitted to being part of a conspiracy to obtain sensitive information from the U.S. government for the PRC,” said Assistant Attorney General for National Security John A. Eisenberg. “His actions are a betrayal of this Nation and pose an unacceptable risk to our national security. NSD remains committed to safeguarding information essential to our national security, including through appropriate prosecution.”
Pauken accepted at least $100,000 for his work with Cathy, and she funded multiple trips between 2019 and 2025 that shuttled him between China and the United States. Those trips were used to meet people who could provide information to Pauken and, ultimately, to Cathy and the Chinese Ministry of State Security, creating a payment and travel pipeline that supported ongoing intelligence collection efforts.
“By his own admission, not only did Thomas Pauken attempt to infiltrate U.S. political circles at the direction of China’s Ministry of State Security, but he gathered intelligence on his American targets and reported it back to his Chinese intelligence handlers,” said Assistant Director Roman Rozhavsky of the FBI’s Counterintelligence and Espionage Division. “This case illustrates the lengths to which the Chinese Communist Party will go to undermine our democratic institutions and degrade our political freedoms, but it also demonstrates the FBI’s resolve to defend the homeland from threats to our national security. Let this plea serve as a clear warning: If you attempt to help a foreign adversary as an unregistered agent in the U.S., the FBI will find you and bring you to justice.”
Federal filings also describe two other individuals Pauken met in China in 2017, known to him as “Richard” and “William,” who told him reports he prepared went to Japan even though Pauken believed those contacts worked for the PRC government. These layers of cover and misdirection are consistent with how foreign intelligence services compartmentalize channels to obscure ultimate beneficiaries.
Pauken is scheduled to be sentenced on Sept. 1 and faces a statutory maximum penalty of 10 years in prison for acting as an agent of a foreign government without notifying the Attorney General. Any actual term will be set by a federal district judge after consideration of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines and other statutory factors; the plea moves the matter from investigation to the sentencing phase under established federal procedures.
The investigation was led by the FBI Philadelphia Field Office with assistance from the FBI’s Washington Field Office, reflecting coordination across field offices when cases span regions and involve foreign-directed networks. Trial Attorney Eli Ross of the National Security Division’s Counterintelligence and Export Control Section and Assistant U.S. Attorney Gavin R. Tisdale for the Eastern District of Virginia are prosecuting the case, which the government says underscores a sustained emphasis on counterintelligence enforcement.
https://x.com/DOJNatSec/status/2062637892678156754
This prosecution lays out a familiar playbook: foreign handlers recruit a willing intermediary, fund travel and communications, deploy off-the-record devices, and direct the intermediary to cultivate sources and collect targeted material. From a policy and enforcement perspective, the case reinforces the need for vigilance, stronger safeguards, and enforcement that holds accountable anyone who acts covertly on behalf of a foreign intelligence service inside the United States.
